Abstract-Privacy preservation is a crucial problem in resource sharing and collaborating among multi-domains. Based on this problem, we propose a role-based access control model for privacy preservation. This scheme avoided the privacy leakage of resources while implementing access control, and it has the advantage of lower communication overhead. We demonstrate this scheme meets the IND-CCA2 semantic security by using random oracle. The simulation result shows this scheme has better execution efficiency and application effects.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of computer network technology and its applications, business, government affairs, scientific experiments based on the network gradually become a main trend of application mode. Nowadays, in order to achieve goals of resource sharing and high utilization rate, geographically dispersed organizations realized dynamic alliance and interoperation through the Internet [1] . Network-based largescale application systems across multiple organizations have some characteristics, such as distributivity, dynamic and open. So access control that crossing multiple management domains must have distributed resources, unknowable subject, isomeric runtime environment, dynamic moving target, independent safety control and etc [2] [3] . We often use "optimistic" mode in traditional distributed access control models. Service requester disclose abilities and subject properties to provider [5] [6] . Access control decisions depend absolutely on consistency proof [7] ， and it use request, security policy, service requester's capability as input. However, these abilities and subject attributes usually carried a lot of privacy information. Unlimited disclosure will bring some safety loopholes and risks to interoperation in multi-domains environments [8] [9] . With the development of information sharing technology and data processing technology, privacy preservation has already become one of the security goals in multi-domains interoperation. Generally ， a false service provider usually obtains requester's attributes by issuing false access control policy. For example, Alice declares that she will provide preferential benefit service in buying houses, and asks requester Bob to provide attribute certifications on income and home address. But this information is considered as privacy, which is not allowed to reveal randomly. Aimed at this kind of security requirements and based on PKI/PMI solutions, we need a reliable third party to provide online service. Ninghui Li presented OSBE [10] which first need to know the signature of certification on the other property, but it increased traffic and it can't resolve the problem in a good way. Based on role-based trust management model, Winsboroug [6] introduced the concept of Attribute Ack Policy. Its basic idea is revealing same attribute Ack policy to a given sensitive attribute, no matter whether it is included by any subject, so the opponent can't judge whether subjects include this property. Security of this policy is not perfect, and it still has privacy leakage problems. Matthew [12] employed threshold-based encryption technology to protect the privacy information,, used access control policy as the secret key of information encryption exchange, and use attribute values related to access control policy as the secret key of information decryption exchange, which make information disclosure meeting access control policy as its precondition. Such a system binds the subject and policy together. However, with the increasing scale of access control policy, processing capacity decreases quickly when facing a complicated policy. Zhiyuan Liu [13] designed a privacy resource preservation scheme which adopted identitybased encryption. The expression ability and efficiency of this scheme were limited, which couldn't satisfy the demand of the security interoperability among multidomains.
For the above problems, based on traditional RoleBased Access Control(RBAC) models [4] [14] , this paper described policy expressions by adopting role Boolean variable, translated policy expressions into Disjunctive Normal Form(DNF) and built a mapping between access control decisions and the values of policy Boolean expressions, taking the elements of policy expressions as component of authorized public key, the user's role as component of authorized private key. This paper presented a privacy preservation scheme of RBAC model based on identity encryption. This scheme avoided the leakage of privacy resources while implementing access control of resources. It was demonstrated that this scheme satisfies the need of IND-CCA2 semantic security. The simulation result showed this scheme has good execution efficiency and application effects. This paper is organized as follows: in Section II we introduce RBAC model and identity-based encryption. We present a role-based access control model which support privacy preservation in Section III. In Section II we analyze security and execution efficiency of this scheme, and give the analysis conclusion and its rigorous proof. Section II summarizes whole paper.
II. RELATED BACKGROUNDS

A. RBAC Model
In this section we first introduce RBAC model as the basic precondition of this paper. RBAC consists of many different components, mainly including two parts:
1. Entity classes: User set U; role set R; administrator role set AR; permission set P; administrator permission set AP; session set S;
2. Mapping/Function classes: UA ⊆U×R, establish relation between U and R; AUA ⊆U×AR, establish relation between U and AR; PA ⊆P×R, establish relation between P and R; APA ⊆AP×AR, establish relation between AP and AR; RH ⊆R×R, establish hierarchical partical order of R; ARH ⊆AR×AR, establish hierarchical partical order of AR (Generally, this partical order in role hierarchy use "≥", if r 1 ≥ r 2 , we call r 1 is the father of r 2 ); Function user: S→U map session to a user; Function role: S→2 R∪AR map session to a role set, role(
What's more, there is a constrain set. It regulates the above components which one is allowed or denied.
B. Identity-Based Encryption
The basic idea of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [15] [16] is directly use a character string which identify user's identity as the public key for encryption, such as e-mail address, ID or other identification. The encryption scheme of IBE build on a distortion of difficult problems of CDH (Computational DiffieHellman), which called BDH(Bil-inear Diffie-Hellman), but Boneh and Fran-klin [16] hadn't given a implement method applied actually until 2001.
The core method of IBE is using a Weil pairing on supersingular elliptic curve. We define a trusted third party which is responsible of generating and sending user's private key as PKG(Private Key Generator), define 
C. Privacy Preservation in Multi-domain Secure Interoperation
In traditional distributed access control model, we often use "Optimistic" mode. On the one hand, service provider disclose the secure policy to service requester, on the other hand, service requester disclose the ability to service provider [5] [6] . Access control policy complete depends on consistency proof which regard request, secure policy, resource requester's ability as input [7] . However, these secure policies often carried a lot of private information, unlimited disclosure will bring about some safety potential and danger to multi-domain interoperation [8] [9] [22] . With the development of information sharing technology and data processing technology, privacy preservation has already become one of the security goals of multi-domain interoperation.
Recently, privacy which related to the information of multi-domain secure interoperation can be divided into two parts: Information Privacy and Possession Privacy [17] [23] . Under ideal conditions, service requester obtains privacy information which access control protect only when service requester satisfies the access control policy of service provider, and get nothing except this. But in practical application, only rely on access control policy to control the information disclosure can't guarantee the strict protection of private information. Access control policy in multi-domain, credential and user ability carried a lot of private information, unlimited disclosure will create conditions for enemy's attack. Service requester might obtain private information before it satisfies the access control policy of this private information [18] [20] [21] . Because there are some connections among semantic hierarchies, the disclosure of non-private information might lead to disclosure of other private information, even they don't carry any private information at all. We called this inference attack [19] .
III. A ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL MODEL FOR PRIVACY PRESERVATION
According to the former analyses, we have known that the majority of access control model employs "optimistic" mode's licensing scheme. Visitor's privacy inf-ormation exposes to the resource owner, and it causes disclosure of the privacy information. Our goal is to make legal users obtain legal access authority as much as possible, and make resource owner obtain visitor's information as less as possible. In this security goal, when user is requesting a resource access, the resource owner can't obtain user's information except user's ID. So it realizes the preservation of user's privacy information.
A. Framework of Model
A typical role-based access control model for privacy preservation can see in figure 1, here's how it works: Figure 1 . The model's framework of RBAC for privacy preservation.
1. Authority request: Users make an application to authorization server (Dealer) for authorization note, in order to obtain a certificate assigned by authorization while implement resource access.
2. Authority response: Based on user's ID, system configuration, related service logic, Dealer implements user's role assignment, analyze user's role set, and distribute user's private key.
3. Policy customization: Resource owner extracts identifications of all roles which related to policy from local policy, and sends public key request to Dealer.
4. Customize request: Dealer distributes public keys to resource owner based on the security policy submitted by resource owner.
5. Access request: User launches service request to resource owner.
6. Request response: The resource owner sends resource response message encrypt by security policy to user.
Finally, the user extracts the disjunctive normal form of Policy from response message, and successfully decrypt ciphertext C, If that, we can obtain corresponding cleartext M, otherwise, this ciphertext is refused.
B. Access Control Policy in RBAC Model
Generally, access control decision is obtained based on user's access request, user's authority, and consistency proof of access control policy. Access control policy is a kind of mandatory constraint condition, using authority as logic expression. It can visit resources only when visitor's authority satisfies the requirement of logic expression's value. In the RBAC model, the policy implements access control by restraining "user own a role" and this role's authority. For the further discussion, we define role's Boolean variable and policy expression first. 
Theorem 1: Decision "allow" of access control model is equivalent to "true" of the policy expression, and decision "deny" of access control model is equivalent to "false" of policy expression.
Demonstration: From Definition 1 we know that the value of role corresponding role Boolean variable is true only when user is assigned a role, otherwise it is false. It established a mapping between "whether user owns the role" and the value of this role's corresponding role Boolean variable{true, false}. The variable is true, which means "User owns the role" in access control policy, or the thesis will be denied if false. Similarly, we also established this kind of mapping in Definition 2. Therefore, the positive decision "allow" in access control model is equivalent to "true" in policy expression, and the negative decision "deny" in access control model is equivalent to "false" in policy expression.
Assume that there is a policy expression (r a ∨ r b ) ∧ (r c ∨ r d ). Only when visitor have one of the corresponding role of role variables r a and r b , and one of the corresponding role of role variables r c and r d simultaneously, the value of policy expression is true, which means visitor satisfies this policy. From this example we know that Boolean expression of a policy exist various "true" valuation methods. For an access requester, you can access legitimately as soon as satisfy only one condition. The relations between these conditions are paratactic, and the disjunctive normal form of Boolean expression to reflect the paratactic relation. For the convenience of our processing, we need to make further treatments in access control policy. We translate all of the policy expressions into disjunctive normal form, then we have (r a ∧ r c )
The translation of disjunctive normal form will not be discussed here.
C. RBAC Model for Privacy Preservation 1. Model Initialization
Model initialization algorithm is done by PKG, for a given safety parameter k Z + ∈ . This algorithm implements as the following operations:
Step 1: Input k generates a prime q and two groups G 1 , G 2 with order q. G 1 is a multiplicative cyclic group, and G 2 is a additive cyclic group. For a feasible bilinear
Step 2: Select a random number * q s Z ∈ .
Step 3: Select a hash function 
Authorization Assignment
Authorization assignment is still done by authorization server, including assignment and reclamation of userrole, authority-role. In order to obtain the certificate of authorization assignment while implementing resource access, user has to apply for authorization notes from Dealer. The process consists of four steps:
Step 1: User sends his identity * {0,1} ID ∈ to Dealer from authorization server;
Step 2: Dealer implements role assignment and analyzes user's role set {r 1 ，r 2 ，…，r m } based on user's ID, system configuration, related service logic;
Step 3: Dealer calculates is called user's private key.
Customize Access Control Policy
In section III, we mapped authorization notes to private key successfully. Now, we use policy expression to construct the public key for encryption. This process consists of four steps:
Step 1: Resource owner extracts all roles' identities r 1 ，…，r n related to policy from local policy;
Step 2: Resource owner sends public key Extract Request = {r 1 ，…，r n } to Dealer;
Step 3: 
D. Resource/Service Access
Resource/Service access includes two steps: encryption and decryption. Messages convey in an overt channel.
Encryption
Step 1: User sponsor Request Message = <ID, SID> to resource owner, SID is the identity of resource/service;
Step 2: Resource owner calculates e r P r P r r P = + + = + + aimed at every disjunction subitem;
Step 4: Calculate 
U G
∉ , then refuse this ciphertext.
Step Step 4: If the test is successful, output the corresponding cleartext M of ciphertext C, otherwise refuse it.
From the process of encryption/decryption we know that a correct decryption occurs only when we have the corresponding private key of encryption public key. In other words, the policy is hidden in the public key successfully in the process of encryption. Recipient's decryption private key includes individual authorization assignment. Decryption hides the consistency verification of policy and user's role, and completes the exchange of private resource in one communication. Safety analysis of this scheme will present in next section.
IV. SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Safety Analysis
Definition 3: If an Enemy who is not bounded by any polynomial wins the game with a superiority that cannot ignored, we think this privacy preservation of the rolebased access control model has IND-CCA2 semantic security.
Setup: Challenger C inputs safety parameter k, then runs the Setup algorithm, and sends system parameters params to Enemy A.
Phase 1: 1) The Enemy selects ID in purpose and sends it to the Challenger (In order to support complicated application environment, a subject may have many different ID and every ID's role set can be different), then make an extraction query to private key. The challenger needs to make a validation about the validity of the Enemy's ID, then send the corresponding private key note set to the enemy; 2) The Enemy selects policy set in purpose, then sends the corresponding role identity set of policy set to Challenger. The Challenger sends the corresponding public key note set to Enemy.
3) The Enemy selects the corresponding encrypted ciphertext c 1 , …, c k of public key note subset in purpose, and sends ciphertext c j (j = 1，。。，k) to the Challenger, then the Challenger decrypts c j (j = 1, …, k) by using decryption algorithm of private key note set, and sends cleartext m j (j = 1,…,k) to the Enemy.
Challenge: Once Enemy considers Phase 1 is over, it will output two isometric cleartexts m 0 ，m 1 ∈M and a public key note set, and restrict that these elements in public key note set appears in phase of extraction of Phase 1. The Challenger selects a random number b∈{0 ，1}, then selects public key note set to encrypt m b by using the encryption algorithm in scheme, and sends ciphertexts to Enemy.
Phase 2: Perform the same operation in Phase 1, only demand that private key extraction query not contain contain the corresponding private key set of public key note set of Challenger, and the decryption query doesn't contain the corresponding ciphertext of cleartext m b .
Guess Here |q| stands for the number of bits of prime q, T stands for the time cost of the modular multiplication.
Demonstration: Assume the system parameters： 
operation and two group calculations. In decryption and authentication phase of Bob, there are one time bilinear mapping and one group calculation. If we don't considerate the cost of communication, accomplish a interoperation will cost time t=∑t i , i=1,2,3,4,5. 
C. Performance Analysis
According to the above analysis, we know that privacy preservation presented in this paper is the IND-CCA2 semantic security. As we knows, the security and performance is a pair of incompatible system and performance is bound to reduce while satisfy the security.Simulations compared with traditional RBAC models indicate that RBAC models for privacy preservation have execution efficiency and application effects. The simulation environment is set where subject A and object B can communicate each other. A is service provider and B is service requester. B sends access request to A, and inspects execution efficiency. According to the difference in resource access transactions, we use different security policy in access process. Different security policy will lead to different execution efficiency. Reversely, we can optimize the configuration of security policy based on execution efficiency. We implement the simulation experiment by using Visual C++ 6.0 in Windows 2000 environments. We can see the result of the simulation experiment in Figure 2 . From the experimental result we can draw the following conclusions: By configuring a reasonable security policy, RBAC model for privacy preservation compared with traditional models, it has a very small influence in execution efficiency, but it is superior to basic model in security aspect.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the traditional access control model, this article introduced the Boolean variable to describe the policy expression, transformed the policy expression into the disjunctive normal form, established a mapping between access control decisions and the value of policy Boolean expressions, introduced the elements of policy expression as public key components, introduced user's role as private key component, and presented a RBAC model for privacy preservation scheme based on identity encryption. This scheme doesn't need a trusted online third-party, and will not disclose user's information except user's ID. It could avoid the disclosure of private information while implementing access control. Just one communication can accomplish the exchange of information while resource requester is interacting with resource owner. Therefore, it has the advantage of lower communication overhead. We demonstrated this scheme satisfies IND-CCA2 semantic security, and the result of the simulation experiment showed this scheme has better execution efficiency and application effect, which solved the problem of privacy leakiness while the resource sharing in the environment of multi-domains and P2P. However, it still needs further study in policy integrality of privacy preservation.
